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THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER
THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
Heather Hamilton
INTRODUCTION
While the right to marry has long been recognized as a fundamental
right by the Supreme Court,' the contention that the fundamental
right to marry encompasses same-sex marriages had, prior to 1996,
been universally rejected by the courts.2 Then, in Baehr v. Miike,3 a
Hawaii Circuit Court held, on remand from the Hawaii Supreme
1. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("[T]he right to marry is of fundamental
importance for all individuals."); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)
("While the outer limits have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions
that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions
,relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and edu-
cation."' (citations omitted)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)
("This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." (citations omitted)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing marriage as
"an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions"); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing marriage as "fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (describing marriage as
"essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888) (describing marriage as "the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress").
2. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to recognize same-sex
marriage as valid for purposes of immigration); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307
(D.C. 1995) (holding that the right for same-sex couples to marry was not protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause nor by a District of Columbia marriage statute);
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (holding that the United States Constitution does
not sanction or protect the right to marry between same-sex couples); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting the contention that the limitation of the right to marry for
opposite-sex couples resulted in violation of the First, Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971) (refus-
ing to recognize a same-sex marriage); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(refusing to grant a same-sex couple a divorce, because same-sex couples could not enter into
common-law marriages); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the
denial of the right to marry for same-sex couples did not deny equal protection of the laws).
3. CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
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Court, that the denial of the right to marry to same-sex couples vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii constitution.4 In
reaching its conclusion, the Hawaii court stated that the State had
failed to sustain its burden of showing that the Hawaii marriage stat-
ute limiting the right to marry to different-sex couples "furthers a
compelling state interest."'5 Thus, same-sex couples in Hawaii should
soon be able to enter into state-sanctioned marriages.6
In anticipation of the imminent legalization of same-sex marriages
in Hawaii, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA"),7 otherwise known as "[a]n Act to define and protect the
4. Id. at *22 (citing HAw. CONST. art. I, § 5). In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993),
remanded sub nom., Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996), the Hawaii Supreme Court examined whether the denial of the right to marry for same-
sex couples solely because the applicants were of the same-sex violated their right to privacy and
equal protection as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution. Id. at 48. The court first held that
the denial of the marriage license did not implicate the constitutional right to privacy, because
the right to same-sex marriage was not so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of
Hawaii's people that failure to recognize it would violate fundamental principles of liberty and
justice. Id. at 57. In addition, the court stated that same-sex marriages are not implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.
Id. The Hawaii Supreme Court then held that the marriage license requirement was subject to
"strict scrutiny," because it was based on impermissible gender classifications. Id. at 63. The
court concluded that because the Hawaii regulation denied same-sex couples the access to mari-
tal status and its concomitant rights and benefits, the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii
Constitution was implicated. Id. The court then remanded the case to the Hawaii Circuit Court
for a determination of whether the statute furthered compelling state interests and was narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights. Id. at 68. Absent such a de-
termination, the court stated the limitation of the right to marry to different-sex couples would
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution. Id.
5. CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21. On remand, the circuit court considered
whether the State had a compelling and substantial interest to justify the sex-based classification
in the Hawaii marriage statute. Id. at *3. The State of Hawaii contended that it had a compel-
ling interest in fostering procreation within a marital setting; in securing or assuring recognition
of Hawaii marriages in other jurisdictions; in protecting the health and welfare of children and
other persons; in protecting the State's public fisc from the reasonably foreseeable effects of
recognition of same-sex marriages; and in protecting the civil liberties of its citizens. Id. Both
the State and the plaintiffs presented expert witness testimony in support or opposition of each
of the State's asserted interests. Id. at *4-16. The court held that the State had failed to establish
or prove any adverse consequences to the public, to the institution of marriage, or to Hawaii
citizens if other states refused to recognize Hawaii marriages. Id. at *18. More importantly, the
court found there was no evidence that recognition of same-sex marriages would have any ad-
verse effects upon the well-being or optimal development of children in same-sex marital house-
holds. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the State had failed to present a significant interest to
justify the withholding of marital status from same-sex couples. Id. at *21.
6. In response to the Baehr decision, the Hawaii legislature amended the Hawaii marriage
statutes to provide that a legal marriage may exist between a man and a woman only. 1994 HAW.
SESS. LAWS 217.
7. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 STAT. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1997)). The Defense of Marriage Act is hereinafter referred to as
DOMA.
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institution of marriage."'8 DOMA has two provisions. The first provi-
sion defines "marriage" and "spouse" under federal law to include
only partners of the opposite sex.9 The congressional exclusion of
same-sex marriages from federal law prevents same-sex marital part-
ners from utilizing numerous federal benefits; according to the United
States General Accounting Office Report on DOMA, there is "a col-
lection of 1049 federal laws classified to the United States Code in
which marital status is a factor." 10
The second provision of DOMA provides that a state "shall not be
required to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states."" The second provision of DOMA will likely face a constitu-
tional challenge on the grounds that it violates the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution. 12 Prior
8. H.R. Res. 3396, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (enacted). Interestingly, DOMA was enacted
in the midst of a congressional and presidential election year. The Hawaii decision generated
much public disdain from the "moral majority." See Greg Zoroya, A Leader Falls Amid a War in
the House Politics: Gay Congressman Steve Gunderson Will Quit, but Not Before Writing a Book,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at E2 (noting that in congressional debate over DOMA, legislators
claimed that gay rights groups were "scheming" to legalize same-sex marriages; that Congress
"must take a stand;" and that a culture that embraces homosexuality is doomed). Congress
reacted swiftly to this negative public sentimentality by passing DOMA. Id. (noting the bill
passed by a vote of 342-67 with only one Republican voting against DOMA). It is likely that this
election year bill was motivated primarily by campaign rhetoric rather than a true need to up-
hold the marriage institution as stated in the bill. See Bill Lambrecht, Election Year Puts Political
Spin on Gay Rights; a Case in Hawaii Challenges Traditional View of Marriage, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, May 20, 1996, at 1A ("[A] social institution regarded by many as clear-cut is a matter
of hot debate. And something regarded as a fringe issue not long ago is being promoted as a key
element of the family-values debate in political campaigns.").
9. 1 U.S.C. § 7. The full language of § 1 of DOMA provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.
Id.
10. Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake
of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263,301 (1997) (citing Report to the Honorable Henry
J. Hyde, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, United States Gen-
eral Accounting Office, Jan. 31, 1997, at 2 (Fed. Doc. Clearing House 1996) <http://www.gao.gov/
reports.htm>); see also infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. In full, § 2 of DOMA states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required
to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, terri-
tory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same-sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Lisa Bennet, No Defense for Congress's Defense of Mar-
riage Act, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 16, 1996, at A9 (opining that "the Defense of Marriage Act is
widely thought to be ultimately indefensible-that is, unconstitutional" because it violates Arti-
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to the passage of DOMA, Congress's power under Article IV has only
been exercised in an affirmative manner, that is, stating that valid acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of other states shall be given effect.13
DOMA represents the first time Congress has exercised its power
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in a negative manner, that is,
stating that a valid same-sex marriage in one state need not be given
effect in sister states.' 4 This exercise of congressional power under
Article IV, thus presents a constitutional quandary of first
impression.1 5
cle IV's Full Faith and Credit Clause); Connie Paige, Gov Knocks Gay Marriage but Calls Fed
Bill Illegal, BOSTON HERALD, July 23, 1996, at 12 (quoting Governor William Feld of Massachu-
setts as stating, "I'm not a proponent [of gay marriages], but I am a proponent of the U.S.
Constitution, which guarantees full faith and credit to a judicial or juridical act of another
state"); Tobias Young, Local Activists Say Law Will be Overturned, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Sept. 22,
1996, at A6 (noting that the president of a local gay, lesbian, and bisexual newspaper said
DOMA would be struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional); Patricia Wen, Mea-
sure Barring Gay Marriages Seen as Vulnerable, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1996, at B1. Wen
noted that "legal experts say someone is bound to bring a lawsuit, asking the court to strike
down the Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional." Id. In addition, Wen interviewed Lau-
rence H. Tribe, a professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School, who said DOMA
violates the part of the Constitution that requires "full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state" and that Congress
cannot invite some states to disregard the official acts of others. Id. Next, Wen interviewed Jay
Sekulow, Chief Counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice in Virginia Beach, Vir-
ginia, who stated that he interprets the Constitution to say Congress does have power to pass
DOMA, because Congress has the power to determine how state actions in one state will be
implemented in other states or how binding they will be. Id. Finally, Wen interviewed Professor
Allan Macurdy of Boston University who stated "[d]oes it violate federalism principles? You
bet." Id.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (stating that acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any
court of any state, territory, or possession, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its territories from which they are taken); id. § 1738A (stating that
child custody determinations made in a state shall be given effect in all other states).
14. Id. § 1738. The exercise of Congress's power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause dif-
fers from congressional legislation in the choice of law context. Choice of law questions address
the allocation of authority among the several states. Douglas Laylock, Comment, Equal Citizens
of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 250 (1992). In particular, when parties are before a state court, choice of law questions
decide which state law should be applied to the controversy. Id. at 255. Choice of law issues are
generally resolved so that the state that has the most "significant contact or significant aggrega-
tion of contacts" with the parties before the court is the state whose law is applied. Id. (citing
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981)).
True choice of law disputes differ from the situation presented by DOMA where there is no
ongoing dispute. The choice is not whether to apply the law of State A or B, but rather, whether
State A should be required to recognize the marriages validly performed in State B. The choice
is, thus, not which State's law to apply but whether or not to recognize another State's law.
15. Because no same-sex couple has yet to be married pursuant to the Baehr decision, no
constitutional challenges to DOMA have yet been filed in the courts. This creates a standing
problem for DOMA opponents. The Supreme Court has explained: "The 'gist of the question of
standing' is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
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This Comment explains why Congress violated the mandates of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause when it enacted section 2 of DOMA.
Part L.A analyzes the text and history of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Part I.B presents the Supreme Court decisions analyzing the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. Part I.C sets forth the reasons why the
right to marry is of paramount concern for same-sex couples. Part I.D
presents the pre-DOMA statutory mechanisms governing the inter-
state recognition of marriages.
Part II examines DOMA against this background. This Comment
recognizes that Congress's power under Article IV, as shown by
Supreme Court precedent, is a remedial power; a power that allows
Congress to give force to the Full Faith and Credit Clause via congres-
sional legislation rather than a power that allows Congress to legisla-
tively remove the requirements of the clause. This Comment
contends that Congress violated those minimum requirements by, for
the first time in congressional history, stating that the states do not
have to follow the mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Part
III will analyze the important repercussions of DOMA on same-sex
couples including the denial of the fundamental right to marry and the
host of marital benefits denied to same-sex couples. Additionally, this
Comment argues that, if upheld as constitutional, DOMA sets a dan-
gerous precedent by giving constitutional effect to a statute rescinding
a protection guaranteed by the Constitution. This Comment con-
cludes that because Congress exceeded its powers under Article IV
when it enacted DOMA, the Act should be declared unconstitutional.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Text and History of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. '16
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."'
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). A
personal stake is created where the plaintiff has an existing controversy with the defendant,
whether the plaintiff is suing on his own behalf or on behalf of a class as well. Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 411 (1975). Presumably, the Court would not entertain a constitutional challenge with-
out a state recognizing same-sex marriages. If no state recognizes same-sex marriages, then
there would be no "existing controversy" as required by the standing doctrine. Id. Accordingly,
until same-sex marriages are actually recognized in Hawaii or another state, any attempt to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of DOMA will likely fail due to standing problems.
16. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1. The precise meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was not
discussed much at either the Constitutional Convention or the state ratifying conventions. See
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). The expectation of the Framers, however,
1998]
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The clause represents a congressional pronouncement that judgments
"shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within
the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.' ' 17 In order
to give effect to the full faith and credit requirement of Article IV,
Congress was expressly granted the power to "by general Laws pre-
scribe the manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof. ' 18
The First Congress passed the Full Faith and Credit Act in 1790.19
The 1790 Act provided methods to authenticate acts, records, and ju-
dicial proceedings and repeated the Full Faith and Credit Clause's re-
quirement that acts, records, and judicial proceedings of states are
entitled to Full Faith and Credit in sister states.20 In 1804, Congress
amended the Full Faith and Credit Act to assure authentication of
non-judicial proceedings. 21 Currently codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1738A,
the Full Faith and Credit Act states: "Acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings ... [of any State] shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States ... as they have by the law or
usage in the Courts of [the] State from which they are taken. ' 22 The
Full Faith and Credit Act governs interstate recognition of laws at all
levels of state and federal government, and includes United States'
territories and Indian tribunals. 23 The Supreme Court has interpreted
was that it be interpreted against "the background of principles developed in international con-
flicts law." Id.
17. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)).
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
19. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
20. Id.
21. Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1994)).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
23. See Clements v. Airport Auth., 69 F.3d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that administrative
agencies' findings must be given full faith and credit in state and federal courts); Semler v. Psy-
chiatric Inst., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that federal courts exercising diver-
sity jurisdiction must give to a judgment of a federal court the same full faith and credit that a
state court would be obligated to give a judgment of state court in another forum); Wayside
Transp. Co. v. Marcell's Motor Exp., Inc., 284 F.2d 868, 870-71 (1st Cir. 1960) (stating that Con-
gress imposed a duty on federal courts through the Act to give full faith and credit to judgments
of state courts); Kumar v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 862 F. Supp. 213, 215 (N.D. I11. 1994) (stating
that federal courts must give preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever courts of that
state would do so); Hall v. Hall, 208 A.2d 593, 595 n.1 (Md. 1965) (stating that DOMA requires
judicial proceedings of both legislative courts and of constitutional courts to be given full faith
and credit); Barrett v. Barrett, 878 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Okla. 1994) (stating that judgments of an
Indian tribal court would be given full faith and credit in state court). But see McDonald v. City
of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 288 (1984) (stating that labor arbitration board findings need not be
given preclusive effect in state and federal courts); Holley v. Seminole County School Dist., 763
F.2d 399, 400 (1th Cir. 1985) (finding that DOMA did not apply to school board proceedings
because such proceedings are not "judicial"); Tonga Air Serv., Ltd. v. Fowler, 826 P.2d 204, 208
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the Full Faith and Credit Act to have only the same effect as the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. 24 Thus, the Full Faith and Credit Act im-
poses no greater requirements than that already imposed by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.
It was not until 1980 that Congress again exercised its Article IV
power when it passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
("PKPA"). 25 PKPA provides that child custody rulings in one state
shall be honored by all other states.26 PKPA applies to all custody
determinations, adoption proceedings, and visitation determina-
tions.27 Like the Full Faith and Credit Act, PKPA has been inter-
preted by the Court to have only the same operative effect as the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.28 Thus, PKPA likewise imposes no greater
requirements than the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
In 1994, Congress twice exercised its Article IV power when it
passed the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of
199429 and the Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994.30 As reflected by
its title, the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of
1994 assures that a child support order entered in one state will be
honored by sister states.31 The Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994
provides that any protection order issued by a state will be accorded
full faith and credit in sister states. 32 Like PKPA, the 1994 Acts were
passed to assure the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in
specific areas, but did not expand the operation of the clause.
Finally, in 1996, Congress passed DOMA pursuant to its Article IV
power. 33 Section 2 provides:
(Wash. 1992) (noting that foreign country judgments are not vested with constitutional or statu-
tory full faith and credit).
24. Thompson v. Thomson, 484 U.S. 174, 183 (1988).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is hereinafter referred to as
PKPA.
26. Id.
27. See Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that child sup-
port determinations and visitation rights are covered by PKPA); In re B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032,
1036-37 (D.C. 1989) (holding that an adoption proceeding is covered by PKPA).
28. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 174.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2265.
33. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. The language of § 2 of DOMA is nearly identical
to the language embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
addresses "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State," U.S. CoNsT. art
IV, § 1, while DOMA addresses "any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe." 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. In addition, both the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and DOMA govern interstate recognition of such acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. Because DOMA states that interstate
19981 949
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No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same-sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship. 34
Section 2 of DOMA was passed to assure that no state will "be obli-
gated or required by operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution to recognize [a same-sex] marriage or
any right or claim arising from it.''35 Congress felt that the passage of
DOMA was necessary to: (1) defend and nurture the institution of
marriage;36 (2) defend traditional notions of morality;37 (3) protect
state sovereignty and democratic self-governance; 38 and (4) preserve
scarce government resources. 39
DOMA stands in sharp contrast to the prior congressional exercises
pursuant to Article IV. While the Full Faith and Credit Act, PKPA,
the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994, and
the Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994 were each enacted to assure
the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in specific areas,
DOMA was passed to assure the clause would not operate in the
arena of same-sex marriages.40 Even DOMA proponents recognized
that DOMA was questionable under the congressional mandate found
in Article IV.41 Therefore, DOMA differs significantly from prior leg-
islation passed pursuant to Article IV.42
recognition of same-sex marriages is not required, DOMA was passed pursuant to Congress's
Article IV power which is embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 1; see also James R. Stoner, Jr., Marriage and the Constitution, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICA-
YUNE, July 7, 1996, at B6 ("Quoting the entire full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
make [sic] plain enough, to common sense if not to every federal judge, the constitutional basis
of the Defense of Marriage Act now before Congress.").
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. Marriage is considered a "record" under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Deborah M. Henson, Note, Will Same-Sex Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Inci-
dents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L.
551, 586 (1994).
35. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 25, (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2929.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id. at 25. DOMA supporters admitted in the congressional debates that "[t]he Founders,
in short, wanted to encourage, even to require the States to respect the laws of sister States."
42. A full awareness of Congress's Article IV power can be realized by distinguishing DOMA
from other congressional legislation addressing domestic relations issues that was passed pursu-
ant to other sections of the Constitution. An examination of the other congressional legislation
[Vol. 47:943
1998] THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Concerning the Mandates of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause
The effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause on interstate recogni-
tion of marriages has never been explicitly examined by the Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, Supreme Court pronouncements on the effects
of this clause provide meaningful insight as to the constitutionality of
DOMA under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This subpart presents
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the requirements of the Full
in the domestic relations area illustrates that Congress has never before passed legislation deny-
ing the substantive right to marry to a class of individuals.
In Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), the Court analyzed the constitutionality of
the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 398, which made it an offense to transport in interstate commerce any
female for prostitution or other immoral purpose. Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 16. The power of
Congress to regulate polygamous marriages centered on Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, because the Act focuses on the transport of females in interstate commerce. Id. at 20.
The Court concluded, based on policy principles, that the Mann Act could encompass polyga-
mous marriages. Id. at 18. The Court reasoned that policy principles warranted this approach
because:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of the Eu-
rope, and until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a fea-
ture of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law, the second marriage
was always void, and from the earliest history of England, polygamy has been treated
as an offense against society.
Id. Cleveland established that Congress may regulate marital relations when the existence of
such a relation constitutes a crime. Id. at 20.
DOMA differs from the Mann Act in several respects. Primarily, DOMA was passed pursu-
ant to Congress's Article IV power rather than its interstate commerce power. H.R. Rep No.
104-664, at 25 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2929. Second, neither DOMA nor
any other legislative enactment, state or federal, criminalizes same-sex marriages. Thus, rather
than committing a crime by passing over state lines, same-sex couples would merely be exercis-
ing their constitutional right to travel.
In Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit analyzed the constitution-
ality of a two-year residency requirement for aliens who marry United States citizens while sub-
ject to deportation proceedings. Id. at 1220 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(h)). The court noted that
Congress had enacted the requirement pursuant to its plenary power over immigration matters.
Id. at 1221. The court concluded that Congress had not overstepped its authority in enacting the
requirement, because the residency requirement did not affect the legal status of marriage. Id. at
1222.
Again, DOMA differs because it was passed pursuant to Article IV. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664,
at 25, In addition, DOMA involves a matter of state expertise, domestic relations, while the INS
regulation involved a matter of congressional expertise, immigration. See Ohio ex rel. Popovici
v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930) (noting that the domestic relations arena is a matter of state
expertise); Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.D.C. 1977) (recognizing that Con-
gress and the United States Attorney General, by Congress's delegation, have authority over
immigration matters and from that authority have derived expertise in immigration matters).
Moreover, DOMA does affect the legal status of marriage. Rather than imposing a waiting
period to enter into a marriage (as was the case in Anetekhai), DOMA states that a marriage
never need be recognized at all. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1994). Cleveland and Anetekhai illustrate
that DOMA represents a unique exercise of Congressional power, extending far beyond prior
restraints to the right to marry.
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Faith and Credit Clause. Subpart I.B.1 presents Supreme Court cases
recognizing the important role of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in
the American system of government and sets forth Supreme Court
pronouncements on Congress's power under Article IV. Subpart
I.B.2 explains the two recognized exceptions to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause: the procedural exception and the public policy excep-
tion. Included in the analysis of these exceptions is a summary of the
application of the public policy exception to same-sex marriages.
1. The Purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Extent
of Congress's Power under Article IV
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is at the heart of our federal government. 43 In Milwaukee
County v. M.E. White Co.,4 4 the Court stated: "The very purpose of
the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several
states as independent foreign sovereignties. ' '45 The clause "prescribes
a rule by which courts are to be guided when a question arises in the
progress of a pending suit as to the faith and credit to be given by the
court to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of a state
other than that in which the court is sitting. '46
In Sherrer v. Sherrer,47 the Court echoed this sentiment and stated
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause "is one of the provisions incor-
porated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of trans-
forming an aggregation of independent sovereign States into a
nation. '48 The Court concluded that the fact that local law must give
way under the weight of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is the price
of having a cohesive nation.49 Sherrer and Milwaukee County illus-
trate the importance of the clause in constitutional jurisprudence.
Despite the important role of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in
our federal government, the Court has addressed the Congressional
power to pass laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause only tan-
43. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co. 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
44. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
45. Id. at 276-77. The Court also held that conflict of law principles are enforceable as a
constitutional mandate. Id.; accord Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (stating that
the clause was enacted with "an expectation that it would be interpreted against the background
of principles developed in international conflicts law"); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)
(stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause "substituted a command for the earlier principles
of comity and thus basically altered the status of the States as independent sovereigns").
46. Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904).
47. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
48. Id. at 355.
49. Id. The Court held that a Florida divorce decree must be given full faith and credit in
Massachusetts. Id.
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gentially. In Thompson v. Thompson,50 the Court examined whether
a congressional statute extended a private right of action under the
clause. 51 At issue in Thompson was the constitutionality of PKPA, an
act passed by Congress which required states to afford full faith and
credit to valid child custody determinations ordered by other states.52
The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that PKPA created a
private cause of action. 53 Instead, the Court stated that PKPA was
only "an addendum to... and is intended to have the same operative
effect as the federal full faith and credit statute. ' 54 Thus, the Court in
Thompson viewed congressional legislation mirroring the language of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause as having no additional substantive
impact.
The Court, however, has made clear that Congress's Article IV
power is limited by the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. In Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,55 a resident of the
District of Columbia received an award of disability benefits under
the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries received in
Virginia. 56 Subsequently, the resident sought a supplemental award
under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act.57 The
employer claimed that the Full Faith and Credit Clause precluded a
second award for the same injuries.58 The Court held that an award of
disability benefits from the Virginia Worker's Compensation Commis-
sion did not preclude a subsequent award of benefits from another
state for the same injury.59 In reaching its decision, the Court re-
versed the Fourth Circuit which had held that the supplemental award
violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 60 In dicta, the Court ex-
plained Congress's Article IV power:
The full faith and credit area presents special problems, because the
Constitution expressly delegates to Congress the authority "by gen-
eral Laws [to] prescribe the Manner in which [the States'] Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
... Yet it is quite clear that Congress's power in this area is not
50. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
51. Id. at 175.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 183.
54. Id.
55. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
56. Id. at 264 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-92 (Michie 1950)).
57. Id. at 265-66 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 501-502 (1968)).
58. Id. at 265.
59. Id. at 286.
60. Id. at 266.
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exclusive, for this Court has given effect to the Clause beyond that
required by implementing legislation....
Thus, while Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure
of faith and credit that a State must accord to the laws or judgments
of another State, there is at least some question whether Congress
may cut back on the measure of faith and credit required by a deci-
sion of this Court.61
The Court's language in Thomas makes clear that Congress has the
power to require states to recognize the acts and judgments of sister
states. The dicta in Thomas also suggests that the Court will question
the constitutionality of any congressional attempt to pass legislation
that authorizes states to ignore the acts of sister states. 62
2. Court-Recognized Exceptions to the Mandates of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and Their Application to Same-Sex
Marriages
The broad language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause contains no
exceptions to its requirements. 63 However, the Court has never con-
sidered the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to be
61. Id. at 272-73 n.18 (citations omitted).
62. The limitations imposed by the Court on the power of Congress to legislate pursuant to
Article IV are consistent with the federalism principles underlying the Constitution. The Consti-
tution gives the Court the power to judge all cases arising under the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. Congress may not indirectly repeal other provisions of the Constitution or violate
the substantive guarantees of the Constitution. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 528 n.7
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991) ("[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism."); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 128-30 (1970) (holding that amendments to the Voting Rights Act enfranchising
18-year olds for the purposes of federal elections, abolishing literacy tests as requisite to vote,
and abolishing durational residency requirements as a requirement to vote in presidential elec-
tions were constitutional but amendments enfranchising 18-year olds to vote in state and local
elections were beyond Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (holding that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment did not em-
power Congress to remove its protections). Thus, Congress is bound by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution when legislating. United States v. Marengo County Comm'n,
731 F.2d 1546, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984). If Congress passes a provision of law that undermines the
authority and independence of another branch, that provision of law is unconstitutional. Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989).
63. See Allstate v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality) (noting that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause only sets forth the requirement that the forum state avoid applying its own
law to a controversy when doing so would be "arbitrary" or "fundamentally unfair"); Alaska
Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (holding that conflicts
between the statutes of two states ought not to be resolved "by giving automatic effect to the full
faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to
those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning
the scale of decision according to their weight"); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 357-58 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873)). In
Sherrer, Justice Frankfurter stated:
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absolute; instead, the clause has been interpreted to impose certain
minimum requirements. In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Company,64
the Court noted that "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
compel a state to adopt any particular set of rules of conflict of laws; it
merely sets certain minimum requirements which each state must ob-
serve when asked to apply the law of a sister state. ' 65 In Phillips Pe-
troleum v. Shutts, 6 6 the Court explained: "The minimum requirements
imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause are that a forum State
should not apply its law unless it has 'a significant contact or signifi-
cant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice
of law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 67 This subpart
examines the Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing the limitations
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In particular, this subpart ana-
lyzes the Court's decisions that held that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not apply to procedural matters, nor to laws, records, or
acts of sister states which would violate the "public policy" of the state
where interstate recognition is desired. 68
It would certainly have been easier if from the beginning the Full Faith and Credit
Clause had been construed to mean that the assumption of jurisdiction by the courts of
a State would be conclusive, so that every other State would have to respect it. But
such certainly has not been the law since 1873.
Id. Had the Supreme Court interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause to be absolute and
admitting of no exceptions or modifications, it is clear that DOMA would be unconstitutional.
This is because under an absolutist approach, any failure by any State to recognize the records,
acts, or proceedings of another State would be an automatic violation of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. See id. Such an approach would be reticent of the approach advocated by Justice
Black in his constitutional jurisprudence. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134-35
(1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press
are absolute prohibitions against governmental regulation); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
70-71 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that the word liberty in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was meant to contain all protections of the Bill of Rights). Perhaps for
the same reasons the Court rejected Justice Black's absolutist approach, it opted against an abso-
lutist approach for the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See CRAIO R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 85-87 (5th ed. 1992) (noting that the Court rejected Black's approach because
many words have more than one meaning; the framer's intent is unclear; some constitutional
provisions embody rules not constitutional principles; and most importantly, it renders judges
without judicial discretion).
64. 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
65. Id. at 516.
66. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
67. Id. at 818.
68. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only to substantive laws between sister states);
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) ("[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a
state to apply another state's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy.").
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a. The Procedural Matter Exception to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause
The Supreme Court has established that the minimum requirements
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause do not extend to procedural mat-
ters. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,69 the plaintiff contended that the
application of the Kansas statute of limitations in a Kansas court vio-
lated the Full Faith and Credit Clause because the Kansas statute of
limitations differed from the law in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana
where the vast majority of the plaintiffs resided.70 The Court dis-
agreed and stated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only to
substantive rather than procedural laws.71 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court explained the substantive-procedural dichotomy:
Except at the extremes, the terms "substance" and "procedure"
precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they
mean in a particular context is largely determined by the purposes
for which the dichotomy is drawn. In the context of our Erie juris-
prudence, that purpose is to establish ... substantial uniformity of
predictable outcome[s] between cases tried in a federal court and
cases tried in the courts of the State in which the federal court sits.
The purpose of the substance-procedure dichotomy in the context
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, by contrast, is not to establish
uniformity, but to delimit spheres of state legislative compe-
tence .... [S]ince the legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap, it
is frequently the case under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a
court can lawfully apply either the law of one State or the contrary
law of another.72
Thus, where the dispute is over which state's law to apply and the law
is procedural in nature, the states are free to apply their own law.73
Same-sex marriage proponents will not likely attempt to rely on the
procedural exception to the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Courts have universally considered the denial of the right to
enter marital union as involving a substantive right, rather than a pro-
cedural right.74 The view of marriage as a substantive right derives
from the many societal and economic benefits attached to the marital
69. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
70. Id. at 736.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 726-27 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467, 471-74 (1965); Guaranty Trust v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
73. Id.
74. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the denial of the right to marry
violates the Constitution); cf Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the procedural limitation of two year residency on the right to marry did not violate the Consti-
tution because the parties were not forever deprived of the right to marry).
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union. 75 While same-sex marriage proponents could raise an argu-
ment that the procedural exception to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause applies, given the recognition by the courts of the substantive
nature of the right to marry, attempted application of the procedural
exception is unlikely.
b. The Public Policy Exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Court has also recognized that the requirements of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause do not extend to those acts, records, or pro-
ceedings, which, if recognized, would violate the public policy of a
state. The public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was first discussed by the Court in Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm'n,76 where the Court stated that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not require a state to apply another state's law in viola-
tion of its own legitimate public policy.77 In Pacific, California desired
to apply its own worker's compensation act in a case involving a Mas-
sachusetts employee and employer conducting business in Califor-
nia.78 The Court reasoned:
It has often been recognized by this Court that there are some limi-
tations upon the extent to which a state may be required by the full
faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another state
in contravention of its own statutes of policy. And in the case of a
statute, the extra-state effect of which Congress has not prescribed
as it may under the constitutional provision, we think the conclusion
is unavoidable that the full faith and credit clause does not require
one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and
events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even though
the statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its
enactment with respect to the same person and events.... Although
Massachusetts has an interest in safeguarding the compensation of
Massachusetts employees while temporarily abroad in the course of
their employment, and may adopt that policy for itself, that could
hardly be thought to support an application of the full faith and
75. See Robert L. Cordell, Comment, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage
and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 247, 255 (1994) (discussing a host of marital benefits denied to same-sex couples
including tax benefits, inheritance rights, health benefits, post-divorce rights, immigration rights,
and the right to bring a wrongful death suit); see also infra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
76. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
77. Id. at 501-02; see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979) (holding that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause did not require a California court to apply Nevada's $25,000 maximum limita-
tion in Nevada's statutory waiver of its own immunity from suit in its own courts); Alaska Pack-
ers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-49 (1935) (holding that a law
exempting certain bonds of the enacting state from taxation did not apply extraterritorially by
virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
78. Pacific, 306 U.S. at 502.
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credit clause which would override the constitutional authority of
another state to legislate for the bodily safety and economic protec-
tion of the employees injured within it. Few matters could be
deemed more appropriately the concern of the state in which the
injury occurs or more completely within its power. 79
Thus, the Court in Pacific established that those extra-state laws that
are "obnoxious to the policy" of the sister state will not be enforced. 80
In Nevada v. Hall,81 the Court made clear the force of the Pacific
holding.82 There, the State of Nevada contended that its $25,000 cap
on damages should be applied in a California court because the cap
would be applicable in Nevada. 83 The Court disagreed, stating that
the application of the Nevada law would violate the public policy of
the State of California. 84 The Court reasoned that Pacific "clearly es-
tablishes that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State
to apply another State's law in violation of its own legitimate public
policy."'85 Because application of the Nevada statute in California
would be "obnoxious to its statutorily based policies of jurisdiction
over nonresident motorists and full recovery," California did not vio-
late the Full Faith and Credit Clause by refusing to apply the Nevada
statute.86 Therefore, the Court has established that laws which violate
a state's public policy will not be subject to the demands of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.
The "public policy" rationale prevents states from being forced to
recognize those acts of other states which are fundamentally at odds
with the views of the resident state. The public policy rationale set
forth by the Court in Pacific is at the heart of the rules governing
interstate recognition of marriages due to traditional state dominance
in the domestic relations area. The Court has made clear that "[t]he
whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the
United States. 87 Matrimonial status is a matter of public concern to
79. Id. at 502-03.
80. Id.
81. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
82. Id. at 421.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); see also Bond v. Trustees of the
STA-ILA Pension Fund, 902 F. Supp. 650, 655 (D. Md. 1995) ("[T]he definition and regulation
of marriage is a traditional area of state authority."). The power of the states in the domestic
relations arena derives from the Tenth Amendment, which establishes the power of the states.
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, "[tihe powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
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the states due to the states' direct interest in the rights between the
contracting parties.88 In essence, states are considered a "third party"
to every marriage contract.89 One court stated: "No state is bound by
comity to give effect in its courts to the marriage laws of another state,
repugnant to its own laws and policy.... Otherwise, a state would be
deprived of the very essence of its sovereignty, the right of supremacy
within its own borders." 90 Thus, states have always had the power to
regulate the effect of marriage upon the property rights of the parties
as well as the qualification of the contracting parties, the formalities
necessary for its creation, the duties and obligations incident to the
marriage relations, and the grounds for its dissolution.91
However, while the Court has recognized the legitimate interests of
the states in controlling their domestic relations, the Court has also
recognized the need for states to recognize marriages validly per-
formed in sister states. In Sherrer v. Sherrer, the Court analyzed the
dichotomy between state control of domestic relations and the re-
quirements under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 92 There, a Florida
divorce decree was being challenged in Massachusetts.93 The Court
stated that:
It is pointed out that under the Constitution, the regulation and
control of marital and family relationships are reserved to the
States. It is urged, and properly so, that the regulation of the inci-
dents of the marital relations involve the exercise by the States of
powers of the most vital importance. But the recognition of the im-
portance of a State's power to determine the incidents of basic so-
cial relationships into which its domicilaries enter does not resolve
the issues of this case. 94
served to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. Thus, because the powers to control
domestic relations were not specifically given to the executive branch, judiciary branch, or legis-
lative branch, the states have control in this area. However, this control is still subject to the
requirements of the Constitution. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (requiring Vir-
ginia to adhere to requirements of the Equal Protection Clause and thus to recognize interracial
marriages); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 354 (1948) (requiring Massachusetts to adhere to
requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and thus to recognize a Florida divorce decree).
The recognition that domestic relations is a matter of state concern simply means that the judici-
ary gives great deference to state laws. Justice v. Justice, 475 S.E.2d 225, 230 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996). In addition, Congress may not pass laws which dictate to the states what their domestic
relations laws must be. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.w.2d 808, 815 (Mo. 1959).
88. Agler, 280 U.S. at 383.
89. Id.
90. Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 4 S.E.2d 364, 366 (Va. 1939).
91. Brawner, 327 S.w.2d at 815 (citing 555 C.J.S. Marriage § 2, 809; 35 AM. JUR. Marriage
§ 12, 187).
92. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 354.
93. Id. at 345.
94. Id. at 354.
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The Court went on to say that state control over domestic relations
must, at times, give way to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 95 The
Full Faith and Credit Clause recognizes Florida's "vital interest" in
maintaining the legitimacy of its divorce decree and, in essence, com-
mands Massachusetts to respect that interest. 96 Sherrer establishes
that, while the Court recognizes the special interests of the state in
regulating its domestic relations affairs, interstate recognition of extra-
state proceedings involving domestic relations are still subject to the
mandates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 97
Opponents of same-sex marriages argue that the public policy ex-
ception is applicable to same-sex marriages, and, hence, a state cannot
constitutionally be required to recognize a same-sex marriage validly
entered into in a sister state. Traditional beliefs of the institution of
marriage, which was one of the stated purposes of DOMA, offer the
strongest basis for critics' argument that a public policy against same-
sex marriages exists. The contention that the right to marry extends to
same-sex couples has been a recent development,98 a contention with
95. Id.
96. Id. at 356.
97. Id.; see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975) (analyzing the constitutionality of Iowa's
one year residency requirement for obtaining a divorce, and stating: "Iowa's interests extend
beyond its borders and include the recognition of its divorce decrees by other States under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 1"). Congress exceeds its powers
under the Constitution where it legislates in the traditional areas of state sovereignty and promi-
nence. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free
School Zones Act exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause). Congress did not
encroach on the power of the states in enacting the Defense of Marriage Act. It is true that "the
whole subject of domestic relations ... belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of
the United States." Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930). Congress does not
infringe on the states' power to "make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life
[which] is committed by the Constitution of the United States to the legislature" of each state
unless the federal and state statutes are in conflict. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971);
accord Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 180 (1978) (finding that the federal Tanker
Law preempted state regulation); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (finding
that the federal Fair Packaging Exchange Act did not preempt state regulation). Conflict exists
only where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). DOMA
states only that the states "shall not be required to recognize same-sex marriages performed in
other states." 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1994) (emphasis added). DOMA does not dictate that a state
cannot recognize same-sex marriages nor does the Act require states to recognize same-sex mar-
riages. Id. Rather, Congress leaves to the discretion of the states whether or not they shall
recognize same-sex marriages, because it imposes no requirement for recognition or non-recog-
nition. Id. Because Congress does not infringe upon the states' ability to define their domestic
relations law, Congress did not usurp the states' power in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.
98. Not until 25 years ago did same-sex couples first begin asserting legal challenges to state
laws prohibiting marriages between persons of the same sex. See H.R. REP. No. 104-604, at 105
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906 (noting that the National Coalition for Gay
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which two-thirds of Americans disagree.99 Studies reveal that the vast
majority of Americans concur with DOMA supporters that "[t]he ef-
fort to redefine marriage to extend to homosexual couples is a truly
radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of mar-
riage." 100 DOMA proponents note that marriage plays a central role
in our society due to the fact that marriage encourages responsible
procreation and child rearing, is necessary to generational continuity,
and represents societal approval of sexual relations.10 1 Given the cen-
tral role of the traditional male-female marital union, same-sex mar-
riage opponents argue that recognition of a same-sex marriage would
violate the public policy of the recognizing state. 10 2
Same-sex couples argue, however, that no public policy exception is
created despite the historical nature of the marital union. Primarily,
they note that not only does society permit heterosexual couples to
marry regardless of their ability to beget children, but same-sex
couples can have a child via artificial insemination or adoption.
10 3
Additionally, even DOMA proponents have admitted that a public
policy exception based on the traditional role of marriage is under-
mined, in part, by the fact that greater threats to the institution of
marriage, such as divorce and unwed parenthood, currently exist.
0 4
Finally, same-sex couples can argue that to center on whether the pub-
lic policy exception applies after the same-sex couple has already been
legally married obscures the focus. After a same-sex couple has le-
gally married the alleged threat to the institution of marriage has al-
ready materialized and, therefore, the focus should be on the rights of
the married couple rather than on the interests of the recognizing
state. Thus, while the traditional role of marriage provides a strong
argument for the application of a public policy exception, same-sex
couples have grounds to dispute its application.
Another potential basis for a public policy exception is the strong
sentiment against sexual relations between persons of the same-sex.
Judeo-Christian ethics condemn homosexuality and support hetero-
Organization first called for the repeal of all legislative pronouncements against same-sex mar-
riages in 1972).
99. Lynn D. Wardle, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex
Marriages, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 57.
100. H.R. REP. No. 104-604, at 105.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Restatement notes "the hardship that might otherwise be visited upon the par-
ties and their children" if marriages were not recognized as valid in sister states. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 283 cmt. (1971).
104. H.R. REP. No. 104-604, at 105.
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sexual marriages. 105 The Bible considers homosexuality an "abomina-
tion.' 10 6 The moral disapproval of homosexuality is reflected by the
legislation in nineteen states which criminalize sodomy.10 7 Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court established, in Bowers v. Hardwick,10 8 that
there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy.'09 In
Bowers, a homosexual man who was charged with the crime of sod-
omy challenged Georgia's sodomy statute claiming the statute put him
in imminent danger of arrest.110 The Court first noted that proscrip-
tions against homosexual conduct have ancient roots."' Based on this
history, the Court reasoned that the Constitution does not confer a
fundamental right upon individuals to engage in homosexual acts."12
105. Id.
106. Mark Tanney, The Defense of Marriage Act: A "Bare Desire to Harm" an Unpopular
Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Government Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99, 119
(1997) ("'If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomina-
tion; they shall be put to death, their blood upon them."' (quoting Leviticus 20:13)).
107. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-659(a)(3) (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1411-1412 (1989); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-22 (Michie 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605
(1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3535 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 28.355 (1990); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886
(1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1994); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-361 (Michie 1988). Of the states criminal-
izing sodomy, the following criminalize only same-sex sodomy: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-22;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3535; Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510; TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06.
108. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
109. Id. at 192.
110. ld. at 188 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2).
111. Id. at 192 (citing Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosex-
ual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986)). The Court also noted that in 1961 all 50
states outlawed sodomy, and in 1986, 24 states and the District of Columbia continued to provide
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private. Id. at 192-94. The current trend is away
from criminalization of sodomy. Primarily, the Model Penal Code incorporated the recommen-
dation of the American Law Institute and decriminalized sodomy. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2
(1962). In addition, two states have determined that criminalization of sodomy violated their
state constitutions. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that the state
may not prosecute acts of consensual sodomy between consenting adults in a private noncom-
mercial setting under the New York Constitution); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50
(Pa. 1980) (finding a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the statutory prohibition
of consensual sodomy forces the majority's notion of morality on persons whose conduct does
not harm others). In addition, there is the issue of whether Bowers is even good law following
the Court's decision in Romers. See Romers v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) (stating that
laws directed at homosexuals are based on animus toward that group and thus are unconstitu-
tional). The obvious trend away from criminalization of sodomy calls into question the legiti-
macy of this public policy rationale. At the very least, the trend away from criminalization of
sodomy illustrates that in the future such a rationale will likely fail.
112. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
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While criminalization of homosexual relations and the Judeo-Chris-
tian disapproval of homosexuality would weigh against recognition,
proponents of same-sex marriages argue that this is not conclusive evi-
dence of the existence a strong public policy. Primarily, use of a sod-
omy statute and Judeo-Christian beliefs to justify the public policy
rationale of Pacific assumes that the parties to a same-sex marriage
are homosexual. As the Hawaii Supreme Court noted in Baehr, sim-
ply because a couple is of the same sex does not necessarily mean the
couple is homosexual because couples wed for a variety of reasons.
113
For example, in Adams v. Howerton,114 a male immigrant attempted
to marry another man in order to qualify as a spouse for immigration
purposes. 11 5 Moreover, the fact that a married couple is of the same
sex does not imply that the couple engages in any sexual activity pro-
scribed by a sodomy statute. 116 Furthermore, application of sodomy
statutes to same-sex married couples would likely violate the privacy
rights of the married couple. 117 Finally, the Supreme Court has re-
jected the contention that Judeo-Christian beliefs may be used to jus-
tify statutory discrimination.11 8
Opponents of same-sex marriages also rely on legislative enact-
ments and case law illustrating the existence of a strong public policy
weighing against recognition. Attorney generals of several states have
issued opinions disapproving of same-sex marriages on legal
grounds.119 In addition, the legislators of eighteen states have enacted
113. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.ll (1993), remanded sub nom., Baehr v. Miike, CIV
No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
114. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
115. Id. at 1038.
116. Id.; cf. Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1296 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that a statement
of homosexuality implies that a person engages in or has desire to engage in homosexual conduct
in the context of the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 686
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (reasoning that the military has the right to assume that a service
member's admission of homosexuality can be interpreted as an admission to past homosexual
acts or future, contemplated homosexual acts); Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 489
(9th Cir. 1991) (finding that private correspondence of bisexuality can be conclusive that a ser-
vice member is bisexual); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the plaintiff's admission that she is a homosexual implies a desire to commit homosexual acts);
see also Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1361 n.19 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]o pretend homosexuality or heterosexuality is unrelated to sexual conduct bor-
ders on the absurd").
117. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding a violation of the constitutional
right to privacy where a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives was applied to a married
couple).
118. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (rejecting the contention that because God
"separated the races ... he did not intend for the races to mix").
119. 190 Op. Ala. Att'y Gen. 30 (1983); 1995 Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. 69 (1995); Op. Ark. Att'y
Gen. No. 95-062 (Apr. 1995); 93 Op. Idaho Att'y Gen. 119 (1993); Op. Kansas Att'y Gen. No.
77-247 (Aug. 1977); Op. La. Att'y Gen. No. 92-699LA (Dec. 1992); Op. Maine Att'y Gen. No.
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legislation which forbids the granting of marriage right to same-sex
couples.'20 Finally, the case law of several states indicates that the
right to marry within the state does not extend to same-sex couples. 121
For example, in Baker v. Nelson, 22 the first case to challenge the pro-
hibition against same-sex marriages, two men filed suit on statutory
and constitutional grounds after the State of Minnesota refused to
grant them a marriage license.1 23 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that although the statute did not contain an explicit prohibition
against same-sex marriage, the legislature did not intend to permit
such marriages.'2 4 The court emphasized the frequent statutory refer-
ences to "bride and groom" and "husband and wife."'1 25 In addition,
the court noted the purpose of marriage was procreation.12 6 The
court concluded that unlike the impermissible marital restriction in
Loving v. Virginia, the state restriction on marriage was based on a
"fundamental difference in sex" and was therefore constitutionally
permissible. 127
Similarly, in Adams v. Howerton, 28 an immigrant attempted to
marry another man in order to qualify as a spouse for immigration
purposes.'2 9 The court relied heavily on the "recognized definition"
of marriage and concluded that no constitutional issues were even im-
84-28 (Oct. 1984); Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. No. 203-96 (June 1996); 77 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 170 (June
1977); Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 96090 (Dec. 1996); Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. No. 97027 (Apr. 1997);
Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. (Aug. 12, 19976); Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. (Oct. 17. 1983); Op. S.C. Att'y Gen.
(Apr. 11, 1996); Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. No. 88-43 (Feb. 1988); Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. No. 94-001
(Jan. 1994); Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. No. 96-1016 (Feb. 1996); 1994 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 60 (1994).
120. The following states have enacted legislation stating that they will not recognize same-sex
marriages: 1996 ALASKA SESS. LAWS 21; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(c) (West 1996); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46a-91r (West 1995); H.B. 503, 138th Leg. (Del. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1
(1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie 1997); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/212 (West 1996); IND. CODE § 31-7-1-2 (1995); S.B. 515, 76th Leg. (Kan. 1996);
H.B. 5662, 88th Leg. (Mich. 1995); S.B. 937, 88th Leg. (Mich. 1995); 1995 N.C. SEss. Laws 588;
S.B. 73, 45th Leg. (Okla. 1996); 23 PA. C.S.A. § 1704 (1996); H.B. 4502, 111th Leg. (S.C. 1996);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 1996); ); TENN. CODE ANN. 336-3-113 (1996); TEX. CODE
ANN. § 68-11-90 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1994).
121. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653
A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971); De Santo v.
Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974).
122. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
123. Id. at 186.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 187 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
128. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 1038.
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plicated in the case.130 And in Anonymous v. Anonymous,131 where a
male plaintiff had unknowingly married a transvestite, thinking "he"
was female, the court concluded: "Marriage is and always has been a
contract between a man and a woman."'1 32 Thus, the court concluded
that New York would not recognize same-sex marriages. 133 While
same-sex couples could argue that these cases merely reflect the previ-
ously discussed grounds for invalidating same-sex marriages, these
cases nevertheless would be persuasive in determining whether a pub-
lic policy against same-sex marriages exists.
The numerous bases on which a state could find the existence of a
public policy against same-sex marriages illustrate the difficulty a
same-sex couple would face in getting their validly contracted mar-
riage recognized in sister-states. Even supporters of DOMA feel that
a state already has the right to refuse interstate recognition of same-
sex marriages. 134 Therefore, while invocation of the public policy ex-
ception of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not conclusive, same-sex
couples will face an uphill battle when attempting to have sister-states
recognize their out-of-state marriages.
C. The Importance of the Right to Marry
Whether DOMA will withstand constitutional scrutiny is especially
important for same-sex couples because the fundamental right to
marry is implicated. As early as 1888, in Maynard v. Hill,135 the
Supreme Court stated that marriage is "the most important relation in
life" and "the foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress."'1 36 In 1923 the Court
in Meyer v. Nebraska137 described marriage as "essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men.' 38 Then, in 1942, the Court
in Skinner v. Oklahoma 39 described marriage as "fundamental to the
130. Id.
131. 325 N.Y.2d 499 (1971).
132. Id. at 500.
133. Id. But cf. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788-89 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (using a
broad definition of the family to allow a homosexual man the possibility of succession to his
lover's rent-controlled apartment).
134. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 25 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930.
135. 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (examining a property dispute between spouses where the wife was
notified that her husband had been granted a legislative divorce).
136. Id. at 194.
137. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state law prohibiting teaching of a foreign language
to children).
138. Id. at 399.
139. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating an Oklahoma statue providing for sterilization of habit-
ual criminals).
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very existence and survival of the race.' 140 In 1965, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,141 the Court explained the fundamental importance of
marriage:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that pro-
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions. 142
Thus, the Supreme Court has long recognized the important role of
marriage in our society.
In 1967, the Court in Loving v. Virginia143 recognized marriage as a
fundamental right under the Constitution. 144 There, the defendants
had violated Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute by marrying in
Maryland and moving back to Virginia. 145 The defendants appealed
their convictions to the Supreme Court, which subsequently struck
down the anti-miscegenation statute on both Equal Protection and
Due Process Grounds. 146 The Court declared that marriage is "one of
the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and
survival."'1 47 Thus, Loving established that the right to marry is a fun-
damental right.
In 1978, the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail 48 extended the Loving
holding to non-racial cases.149 There, a Wisconsin statute was at is-
sue. 150 The statute had deprived the petitioner of the right to obtain a
marriage license due to his inability to pay his outstanding child sup-
port obligations. 51 The Court struck down the statute as unconstitu-
140. Id. at 541.
141. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives as a
violation of the right to marital privacy).
142. Id. at 486.
143. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a Virginia statute that prohibited interracial marriages).
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 12; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
147. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (finding that the right to marry is a fundamental right subject to
strict scrutiny).
148. 434 U.S. 374 (1965) (striking down a Wisconsin statute that prohibited the marriage of a
non-custodial parent without court approval as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
149. Id. at 384.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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tional and held: "Although Loving arose in the context of racial
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm
that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individu-
als."' 152 Zablocki reaffirmed that the right to marry extends to all indi-
viduals. Therefore, Supreme Court precedent recognizes that
marriage is a fundamental right for all individuals.
In addition to the fundamental nature of the right to marry, the
multiple benefits attached to the marital union make the right to
marry of paramount concern for same-sex couples. Some 1,049 fed-
eral statutes grant benefits to persons based on their marital status.
1 53
These benefits include the following: bankruptcy protection,154 burial
rights,155 medical benefits,156 pension benefits, 57 welfare benefits,158
government education loans, 59 preferential tax treatment, 60 surviv-
ing spouse rights relating to veterans benefits,' 6' copyright protec-
tion, 162 and social security benefits.163
Additionally, many state benefits are contingent upon the marital
status of an individual. Examples include: (1) inheritance rights such
as notice, protection, benefits, dower, and curtsey; 64 (2) health bene-
fits, including insurance coverage, next-of-kin status, public assistance,
and exemptions relating to state health departments; 165 (3) post-di-
vorce rights, including spousal support and property division; 66 (4)
ability to exempt real property from attachment or execution;167 (5)
152. Id.
153. Robb, supra note 10, at 263.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1994) (granting bankruptcy protection for debts of spouses and
former spouses).
155. 38 U.S.C. § 2405(5) (1994) (discussing rights to maintenance of burial plots for veterans).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 426 (1994) (granting hospital insurance benefits to spouses of eligible
individuals).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 83390) (1994) (stating that the survivor annuity is affected by one's marital
status).
158. 42 U.S.C. §1382(b) (noting that the amount of social security benefits was conditioned
upon one's marital status).
159. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087nn(b)(1)(A), 1087pp (1994) (basing government loans upon expected
family contribution).
160. 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (1994) (allowing a husband and wife to file joint tax returns).
161. 38 U.S.C. § 3712(a)(4)(A)(vi)(III), (C) (1994) (granting surviving spouses of veterans
housing benefits to which the veteran was entitled); id. §§ 3501, 3511 (giving surviving spouses of
veterans financial assistance for educational programs).
162. 17 U.S.C. §8 101, 304(c)(2) (1994) (granting copyright protection for all works of art
created by deceased spouse to widow[er]).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), (e), (f) (granting a surviving spouse death benefits).
164. Cordell, supra note 75, at 255 n.52-54 (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE (1985); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 533, 560 (1985 and Supp. 1992)).
165. Id. at 255 n.55 (citing HAw. REV. STAT. § 346).
166. Id. at 256 n.56-61 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572, 575, 580).
167. Id. at 256 n.62 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 651).
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the right to bring a wrongful-death suit;168 (6) housing rights;169 and
(7) guardianship rights. 170 Finally, a number of private benefits are
attached to marital status such as insurance coverage on car rentals
and announcements of marriage and engagement in newspapers. 171
Given the numerous benefits attached to the marital union and the
fundamental nature of the right to marry, the right of a same-sex
couple to wed is of utmost importance to those individuals.
D. Statutory Mechanisms Regarding Interstate Recognition of
Marriages
Both the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws172 and the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA") 173 establish statutory
guidelines for interstate recognition of marriages. 174 Both set forth
the general rule of lex celebrationis-a marriage valid in the state
where celebrated is valid in all sister states. Subpart I.D.1 presents the
Restatement approach to the interstate recognition of marriages. 75
Subpart I.D.2 analyzes the approach of UMDA.
1. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
The majority of the states have adopted the approach of the Re-
statement, 176 which establishes that a marriage validly entered into
will be valid in all other states absent the violation of a strong public
policy. 177 Section 283 sets forth the general rule of validity:
168. Id. at 256 n.63 (citing HAw. REV. STAT. § 663).
169. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508,
1613 (1989) (noting that many zoning ordinances limit multi-person dwellings to a family defined
as a husband, wife, and their immediate and extended families).
170. See In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowlaski, 478 N.W.23d 790, 791-92 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (granting guardianship rights to the parent of an injured woman rather than to the
woman's same-sex partner).
171. Cordell, supra note 75, at 257 n.64-65 (citations omitted).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1988).
173. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 210 (1973).
174. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283; see also Hadix v. Johnson,
933 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that Congress usurped an "exclusively judi-
cial" role in enacting the Prison Litigation Reform Act, because it obviates the "most basic
power of the Judiciary's power under Article III," the need for a "case-by-case determination").
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 283; UNIF. MARRIAGE & Di-
VORCE ACT § 210.
176. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1994); Vandever v. Industrial Comm'n, 714
P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Ark. 1957); Henderson
v. Henderson, 87 A.2d 403, 408 (Md. 1952); Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 213 N.W. 32,
33 (Minn. 1927); Bucca v. State, 128 A.2d 506, 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957); Leszinske v.
Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1053 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4,6 (N.Y. 1953).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283.
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(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of
the state, which with respect to the particular issue, has the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where
the marriage was contracted will everywhere be valid unless it vio-
lates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouse and the marriage at the time of
the marriage.178
Thus, marriages are generally upheld absent a violation of a strong
public policy in the state that has the most significant relationship to
the couple.
To meet the requirements of section 283, three prerequisites must
be satisfied. First, it must be determined whether the marriage satis-
fies the ceremonial requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted, that is, it must be determined that the marriage is valid.
1 79
Second, it must be determined which state has the most significant
relationship with respect to the particular issue.180 In making this de-
termination, the Restatement focuses on: (1) the needs of the inter-
state and international systems; (2) the relevant policies of the forum;
(3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relevant
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue;
(4) the protection of justified expectations; (5) the basic policies un-
derlying the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result; and (7) ease in the determination and application
of the law to be applied t81 Of these factors, the Restatement empha-
sizes the importance of maximizing predictability and uniformity, and
the need to ensure the implementation of the relevant policies of the
state with the dominant interest in the determination of the particular
issue.182 The state with the most significant relationship to the newly
married couple is, thus, determined from balancing all the relevant
competing factors.
1 83
178. Id.
179. Id. § 283(2).
180. Id. The Restatement's "most significant relationship" test follows the general rules es-
tablished in making choice of law decisions. See Douglas Laylock, Comment, Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 255 (1992) (noting that choice of law issues are generally resolved so that the state that
has the most "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts" with the parties before
the court is the state whose law is applied (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308
(1981))).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (incorporated by reference into
§ 283(1)).
182. Id. § 283 cmt. b.
183. Id.
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Third, it must be determined whether recognition of the marriage
would violate a strong public policy of the state with the most signifi-
cant relationship. 184 In reaching this determination, courts look to
state statutes that define the criteria for invalidation of extra-state
marriages. 85 These statutes prohibit two types of marriages: those
entered in other states solely to avoid the couple's resident state
laws,' 86 and those between close family members. 187 Similarly, stat-
utes prohibiting same-sex marriages could also be considered under
this prong of the Restatement's inquiry.188
In determining whether recognition of the marriage would violate
the strong public policy of the state, a court may also consult the
state's case law. 189 Generally, cases have invalidated only those mar-
riages involving incest, minors, remarriage before a finalized divorce
proceeding, or polygamy. 190 In the same-sex marriage context, there
184. Id.
185. Id. § 283 cmt. k.
186. See UNIF. MARRIAGE EVASION ACT XXI (1957).
187. See Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate Recogni-
tion of Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 911, 921. Marriages that are prohibited under
these laws include those between: (1) parents and children, (2) grandparents and grandchildren
of every degree, (3) brothers and sisters (both whole and half-blood), (4) uncles and aunts and
their nieces and nephews, and (5) first cousins. Id.
188. For a list of the states with statutes denying recognition to same-sex marriages, see supra
note 120.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283.
190. See D'Amato, supra note 187, at 918-21 (citing Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 557 (Ala.
1938) (denying recognition to an out-of-state marriage that violated a prohibition against inces-
tuous marriages); Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726 (Conn. 1961) (denying recognition to an
incestuous marriage); Smith v. Smith, 11 S.E. 496 (Ga. 1890) (refusing to recognize a marriage
where the marriage would be invalid under state law due to the couple's age); Wilkins v. Ze-
lichowski, 140 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1958) (refusing to recognize a marriage where the marriage would
be invalid under state law due to the couple's age); Bucca v. State, 128 A.2d 506 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1957) (denying recognition to an incestuous marriage); Ross v. Bryant, 217 P.2d 364
(Okla. 1923) (refusing to recognize a marriage where the marriage would be invalid under state
law due to the couple's age); Johnson v. Johnson, 106 P. 500 (Wash. 191.0) (denying validity of a
marriage which was incestuous)). But cf. D'Amato, supra note 187, at 917-21 (citing Etheridge
v. Shaddock, 706 S.W.2d 395 (Ark. 1986) (recognizing as valid a marriage between first cousins
when performed in a state allowing such marriages, although such marriage could not be entered
into in Arkansas); State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957) (recognizing a marriage as valid
where the couple would be prevented from marrying under Arkansas law due to age); Osburn v.
Graves, 210 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ark. 1948) (recognizing a common-law marriage entered into in a
sister state because "to do otherwise there would inevitably be a denial of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause"); McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1936) (validating a marriage
although the couple married at an age younger than that allowed in the state); Spencer v. People,
292 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1956) (en banc) (recognizing a marriage as valid where the couple would be
prevented from marrying under Colorado law due to their age); Mangrum v. Mangrum, 220
S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949) (recognizing a marriage as valid where the couple would be
prevented from marrying under Kentucky law due to their age); In re Millers' Estate, 214 N.W.
428 (Mich. 1927) (recognizing a marriage between first cousins although Michigan law prohib-
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have been no cases addressing interstate recognition of same-sex mar-
riages, because no couple has yet to be married subsequent to the
Baehr decision.191
In addition to case law, courts may unilaterally determine that a
violation, not yet addressed by any case or statute, is still sufficiently
strong to create a strong public policy that necessitates the marriage
not being recognized. 192 This inquiry could also be relevant in the
same-sex marriage context. No case law has yet addressed interstate
recognition of same-sex marriages. Moreover, only a minority of the
states have enacted statutes banning recognition of same-sex mar-
riages.193 Thus, without case law or a legislative determination upon
which to base non-recognition of a same-sex marriage, courts may be
forced to invoke this portion of the Restatement's inquiry. In conclu-
sion, under the Restatement approach, absent a strong public policy
necessitating invalidation, the marriage will be upheld as valid.
ited such marriages); Ma v. Ma, 483 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a valid
Chinese marriage was enforceable in Minnesota despite the fact that such a marriage did not
meet the procedural requirements for a ceremonial marriage in Minnesota, because a valid Chi-
nese marriage does not violate the public policy of Minnesota); Lawszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d
1049 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing a marriage between an uncle and a niece entered into in
Costa Rica although such marriages were forbidden in New Mexico); In re May's Estate, 114
N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953) (upholding a marriage between an uncle and a niece); Hilliard v. Hilliard,
209 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (recognizing a marriage as valid where the couple would be
prevented from marrying under New York law due to age); Campione v. Campione, 107
N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (recognizing as valid a marriage between an uncle and a niece
entered into in Italy); Mazzoline v. Mazzoline, 155 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1958) (validating a mar-
riage between first cousins although such marriages are invalid under Ohio law)).
191. While no state court has yet addressed a case involving recognition of an extra-state,
same-sex marriage, several courts have rejected the contention that a right to marry exists under
the various states' laws or constitutions. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982)
(refusing to recognize same-sex marriage as valid for purposes of immigration); Dean v. District
of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (holding that the right for same-sex couples to marry was
not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause nor by the District of Colum-
bia marriage statute); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (holding that the United
States Constitution does not sanction or protect the right to marry between same-sex couples);
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting the contention that the limitation of
the right to marry for different-sex couples resulted in a violation of the First, Eighth, Ninth, or
Fourteenth Amendments to United States Constitution); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325
N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971) (refusing to recognize same-sex marriage); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d
952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (refusing to grant a same-sex couple divorce, because same-sex couples
could not enter common-law marriage); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that the denial of the right to marry for same-sex couples did not deny equal protection
of the laws). States may assert that this case law is relevant in the inquiry set forth in section 283
of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoFLICr OF LAWS § 283.
192. D'Amato, supra note 187, at 923.
193. See supra note 120.
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2. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 194 also sets up a framework
for determining the validity of marriages contracted outside of the
state in which recognition is sought. UMDA focuses upon the need to
promote marital stability between states.195 Eight states have adopted
UMDA: Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, and Washington. 196 Section 210 of UMDA provides that:
All marriages contracted within this State prior to the effective date
of this Act, or outside this State, that were valid at the time of the
contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which
they were contracted or by the domicile of the parties, are valid in
this State.197
The only exceptions UMDA gives to mandated recognition are polyg-
amous and incestuous marriages. 198 UMDA "expressly fails to incor-
porate the 'strong public policy' exception of the Restatement
[(Second) of Conflict of Laws]."1 99 The Restatement's public policy
exception was not incorporated in order to "preclude invalidation of
many marriages which would have been invalidated in the past. '2 00
Same-sex marriage proponents could argue that because UMDA
fails to list same-sex marriages as an exception to mandated recogni-
tion, that recognition of a validly contracted same-sex marriage is
mandated. However, despite the statutory language to the contrary, it
is clear that States that have adopted UMDA, like the states that have
adopted the Restatement, nevertheless retain the right to deny recog-
nition based on public policy grounds.2° 1 Additionally, while UMDA
does not list a same-sex marriage as one in which recognition is not
required, same-sex marriages were not yet recognized when the last
version of UMDA was adopted in 1973.202 Therefore, same-sex mar-
riage opponents have a strong argument that an exception was not
194. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Ac-r § 210 (1973).
195. Id.
196. Harold P. Schombert, Note, Baehr v. Lewin: How Far Has the Door Been Opened?
Finding a State Policy for Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 331, 345
n.34 (1995).
197. Id. at 345.
198. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 210.
199. Id. § 210 cmt.
200. Id.
201. See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriages and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are
We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033, 1070-71 ("[E]ven states with
validation statutes may turn to public policy to determine whether [a same-sex] couple's mar-
riage would be valid.").
202. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 210.
[Vol. 47:943
THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
included because same-sex marriages were not yet validly recognized
in any state.
II. ANALYSIS
Congress's declaration via DOMA that states need not recognize
same-sex marriages ,alidly contracted in a sister state rescinds the op-
eration of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the area of interstate
recognition of same-sex marriages. The text and history of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Supreme Court cases interpreting the
requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause amply illustrate that
Congress's action was unwarranted, unprecedented and
unconstitutional.
This subpart illustrates the reasons why DOMA is fatally deficient
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. Subpart
III.A analyzes Congress's authority to pass DOMA and concludes
that Congress failed to abide by the requirements of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause when it passed DOMA. Subpart III.B explains that
Congress's action via DOMA was unnecessary because the current
statutory mechanisms governing the interstate recognition of mar-
riages, the Restatement and UMDA, offer adequate protection to the
states. Finally, subpart III.C briefly presents the other constitutional
provisions potentially violated by the passage of DOMA.
A. DOMA Violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause
DOMA represents an unprecedented exercise of congressional au-
thority under Article IV. Prior congressional actions taken pursuant
to Article IV have always given effect to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause in a particular area. Congress's first and second exercises of its
legislative power under Article IV, the Full Faith and Credit Act of
1790 and the subsequent amendment in 1804, assure that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause will be given effect in interstate recognition of
acts, records, and judicial proceedings. Indeed, the language of the
Full Faith and Credit Act mirrors the language of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.
Similarly, PKPA, the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Or-
ders of 1994 Act, and the Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994 all
represent positive enactments of Congress's Article IV power. PKPA
was passed to assure child custody determinations would be honored
in sister states; the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders of
1994 Act was passed to assure child support orders would be honored
in sister states; and the Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994 was
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designed to assure that sister states would honor protection orders is-
sued by sister states.
In marked contrast to these prior congressional statutes passed pur-
suant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, DOMA represents an exer-
cise of Congress's Article IV power to not give effect to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause in a specific area, that of same-sex-marriages. The
congressional record of DOMA reveals that it was Congress's specific
intent that no state would "be obligated or required, by operation of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, to
recognize [a same-sex marriage]. o20 3 To effectuate this congressional
intent, Congress enacted section 2 of DOMA which authorizes states
to ignore the Full Faith and Credit Clause in determining whether to
grant recognition to an out-of-state same-sex marriage.
The enactment of section 2 created a statutory exception to the con-
stitutional mandate of Article IV. The language of the Full Faith and
Credit Act and the Full Faith and Credit Clause are identical; thus, it
is clear that DOMA implicates both the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Full Faith and Credit Act equally.204 While Congress has the
authority to pass legislation enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause
under Article IV, the Supreme Court has considered two of the statu-
tory exercises of Congress's Article IV power, the Full Faith and
Credit Acts and PKPA, to be mere addenda to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 20 5 The Court reasoned that the Full Faith and Credit
Act and PKPA were addendums to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
since those acts' language mirrored the language of the clause.20 6
While the Court has not yet addressed the constitutional effect of
either the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994
or the Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994, it is likely that these acts,
like the Full Faith and Credit Act and PKPA, would be seen as ad-
denda to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, since these acts have lan-
guage mirroring the clause. In contrast to these acts which are mere
addenda to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, DOMA's language
removes the protection of the clause in the area of same-sex mar-
riages. By passing DOMA, therefore, Congress has, for the first time,
enacted legislation removing the constitutional right given by the
clause.
Analysis of the text and history of Article IV reveal that Congress
exceeded its Article IV power when it created a statutory exception to
203. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 105 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
204. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
205. U.S. CONsr. art. IV; see supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
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the Full Faith and Credit Clause. While the Effects Clause empowers
Congress "by general Laws [to] prescribe the manner in which such
Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof," Congress is bound by the first clause of Article IV which
states that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings. 2 0 7 The shall language
utilized in Article IV represents a congressional mandate that full
faith and credit be given to sister states acts, records, and judicial
proceedings.
Despite the clear wording of Article IV, DOMA proponents con-
tend the effects clause encompasses an implicit congressional power to
remove the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 20 8 In sup-
port of this contention, DOMA proponents cite PKPA as precedent.
However, in contrast to DOMA which was intended to remove the
operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, PKPA was intended to
assure the operation of Article IV. Congress passed PKPA because of
the refusal of many states to recognize the valid child custody orders
of sister states. The diametrically opposed congressional purposes re-
veal that analogy to PKPA is unpersuasive.
Additionally, the Supreme Court's interpretation of PKPA reveals
that it cannot provide support for DOMA. In Thomas, the Court rec-
ognized that PKPA imposed no substantive demands beyond that im-
posed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.209 Thus, PKPA was held to
merely reiterate the requirements of Article IV.210 DOMA, in con-
trast to PKPA, removes the requirement of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Therefore, PKPA does not provide a basis for Congress's
actions.
Furthermore, the contention that Article IV contains an implicit
power to remove the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is undermined by a comparison of Congress's Article IV power to
Congress's enumerated powers. Article I, section 8, sets forth numer-
ous distinct powers given to Congress including such specific powers
as the power to coin money and to grant letters of marque and repri-
sal.21' None of these enumerated powers include the right to rescind
the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, nor can an implicit
power be implied. In Thomas, the Court recognized that Congress
207. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
208. In the congressional record of DOMA, Congress stated it "retains a discretionary power
to carve out such exceptions as it deems appropriate." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 105.
209. See infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
211. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
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clearly had the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that
a state must accord to the laws or judgments of another state.212 The
Court did not answer the question whether or not Congress could cut
back on the measure of faith and credit required by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.2 13 Thomas, therefore, suggests that the Effects Clause
does not encompass a power to deny full faith and credit to valid state
judgments. This reading of Thomas is consistent with the Court's de-
cision in Katzenbach v. Morgan214 where the Court held that article
five of the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress to re-
move its constitutional protection.215 Like the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Article IV lacks language authorizing the removal of its
constitutional protections. Like the Fourteenth Amendment, Article
IV's powers are a constitutional mandate. Since the Constitution does
not specifically grant Congress the power to remove the Full Faith and
Credit Clause's mandate, and since the Effects Clause of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause (like section five of the Fourteenth Amendment)
does not grant Congress the specific power to remove its protection, it
is unlikely that such a power exists.
Proponents of DOMA may also argue that DOMA does nothing
more than recognize the traditional state dominance in domestic rela-
tions. This argument is likewise unpersuasive. In Sherrer, Massachu-
setts utilized that same argument to avoid application of a Florida
divorce decree. 216 The Court quickly rejected the contention that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause lacked force due to a domestic relations
issue being involved.217 The Court noted that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause was expressly enacted to assure that Florida's "vital in-
terest" in having its divorce decree honored was protected. 21 8 Just as
the state in Sherrer had a vital interest in maintaining the legitimacy of
its divorce decree, a state granting a marriage license to a same-sex
couple has a vital interest in assuring that marital union is recognized
by other states.219 Traditional state dominance of marital relations,
therefore, cannot justify DOMA's legislative pronouncement that
same-sex marriages need not be recognized.
Equally unpersuasive is the contention that DOMA can be justified
as a Court recognized exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
212. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980).
213. Id.
214. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
215. Id. at 651 n.10.
216. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 354 (1948).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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The Supreme Court has frequently stated: "Constitutionally created
rights cannot be abridged by an act of Congress. '220 The Supreme
Court has recognized only two instances in which a state may refuse to
apply the law of another state without violating the Full Faith and
Credit Clause: (1) for laws which impugn a state's public policy;2 21 and
(2) for laws which are purely procedural.22 2 Because same-sex mar-
riages are not a third category from which the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has no application, one of these two exceptions must apply for
DOMA to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The procedural exception to the requirements of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is not implicated by same-sex marriages. The denial of
the right to marry involves a substantive right rather than a procedural
right.2 23 Because marriage is a substantive and fundamental right,
same-sex marriages must, therefore, violate the public policy of the
state refusing recognition in order to be consistent with the Court's
jurisprudence addressing the Full Faith and Credit Clause.224
The public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause that
was set forth in Pacific likewise fails to save the constitutionality of
DOMA. The public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause plainly requires a state to determine that recognition of an act
or judgment of a sister state would result in the violation of the state's
public policy.225 DOMA, however, removes the requirement that a
public policy exist and instead authorizes the states to unilaterally
deny recognition to the same-sex marriage. DOMA's abrogation of
the necessary finding of a public policy against same-sex marriages
makes the public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
inapplicable, and thereby renders DOMA unconstitutional.
DOMA supporters will likely argue, in order to save the constitu-
tionality of DOMA, that DOMA represents nothing more than a pro-
nouncement that a public policy against same-sex marriages must exist
220. Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (citing Northern Pipeline
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982)). In Hadix, Congress had granted stays
under the Prison Reform Litigation Act. Id. at 1362. The court held that Congress had usurped
a role which was "exclusively judicial," by taking away the "power [from the judiciary] to decide
substantive issues of law." Id. at 1366.
221. Pacific Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1953).
222. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736-37 (1988).
223. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the denial of the right to marry
violates a person's substantive rights under the Constitution); cf. Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d
1218, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a procedural limitation of a two-year residency on the
right to marry did not violate the Constitution because the parties were not forever deprived of
the right to marry).
224. Pacific, 306 U.S. at 494.
225. Id. at 502-03.
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before recognition is denied. DOMA supporters will note that the
Court construes statutes in ways to prevent them from being declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, would favor a finding of constitution-
ality for DOMA.226 Additionally, DOMA supporters will note that
one of the purposes of DOMA was to "protect the rights of the States
to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of
same-sex unions, free from any federal constitutional implications that
might attend the recognition by one State of the right for homosexual
couples to acquire marriage licenses.122 7 However, this very purpose
of DOMA will prevent a finding of constitutionality. While a state
may have a strong argument that such a policy exists,228 the fatal flaw
of DOMA lies in the fact that it authorizes states to deny recognition
without consideration of any federal constitutional implications. Be-
cause DOMA allows states to deny recognition without consideration
of the requirements imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
DOMA rescinds the application of Article IV and is, therefore,
unconstitutional.
Additionally, DOMA cannot be seen as a congressional determina-
tion of the public policy of a state. As the Supreme Court has recog-
nized, the subject of domestic relations, including the marital status of
parties, "belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the
United States. '229 Accordingly, the determination of whether a public
policy against same-sex marriages exists in a state is a judgment re-
served to the state rather than to Congress.2 30 As an act of Congress,
DOMA, therefore, could not constitutionally determine what the pub-
lic policy of a given state regarding same-sex marriages was without
infringing on the sovereignty of the state. Indeed, DOMA does not
purport to define the public policy of any state regarding same-sex
marriages. Because of this and because DOMA does not require the
states to determine, before invoking the law, that a public policy exists
against same-sex marriages, DOMA rescinds the operation of the Full
Faith Credit Clause and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
226. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a
statute from unconstitutionality.").
227. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 105 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
228. See supra notes 76-134 and accompanying text.
229. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930) (citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890)).
230. See Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 4 S.E.2d 364, 366 (Va. 1939) (noting that a
state would be deprived of "the very essence of its sovereignty" if it did not have the ability to
determine what laws were "repugnant to its own laws and policy").
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DOMA ignores the rationale behind the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the fram-
ers intended to impose a constitutional directive via the clause to re-
quire states to recognize the acts of sister states. 231 The Court has
frequently stated that the Framers imposed this constitutional man-
date in recognition of the fact that only by requiring states to give full
faith and credit to the acts of sister states could the United States be
transformed from a collection of individual sovereign states into a co-
hesive nation.2 32 Instead of requiring states to grant comity to the val-
idly contracted same-sex marriages, DOMA rescinds the application
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In the area of same-sex mar-
riages, DOMA recasts the United States from a cohesive nation into a
collection of individual states, each free to give or not give effect to
same-sex marriages as it so desires. Because DOMA focuses on the
individual desires of each state rather than on the interests of the na-
tion in having the acts of each state recognized throughout the nation,
DOMA undermines the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and should be declared unconstitutional.
B. The Passage of DOMA was Unnecessary
Congress defended its decision to pass DOMA on the grounds that
without DOMA states could be required to recognize same-sex mar-
riages validly contracted in sister states by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Analysis of the current statutory mechanisms governing the
interstate recognition of marriages, the Restatement and UMDA, re-
veal that Congress unnecessarily rescinded the operation of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause because both the Restatement and UMDA
adequately protect states' rights.233
The Restatement protects the interests of the states by allowing
states to deny recognition to same-sex marriages. Section 283 of the
Restatement contains the public policy exception set forth by the
Court in Pacific.234 In order to invoke this exception, the state must
first show that it has a significant relationship with the married couple.
While the Restatement sets forth seven specific factors to consider in
determining the state with the most significant relationship to the
231. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948);
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U. 268, 276-77 (1935).
232. Estin, 334 U.S. at 546; Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 355; Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 276-77.
233. Professor Laurence H. Tribe contends that DOMA merely codifies the state's existing
ability to deny recognition to same-sex marriages on public policy grounds and, therefore,
DOMA is unnecessary. 142 CONG. REC. 55931-01 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Profes-
sor Laurence H. Tribe).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
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married couple,235 the contacts necessary to survive a constitutional
challenge have been described as "incidental. ' 236 If Hawaii or an-
other state recognized a same-sex marriage, therefore, it is clear that
the recognizing state could likely satisfy the Restatement requirement
that it have the most significant relationship to the married couple.
That the state could satisfy this requirement would be especially clear
if the same-sex couple resided in the state in which recognition was
sought and had merely traveled to the other state in order to be
married.
Once a state determined that it had the most significant relationship
to the married couple, the state could deny recognition provided it
proved the existence of a strong public policy against recognition of
the same-sex marriage. The basis of a public policy exception could
be invoked on numerous grounds including the traditional role of the
male-female marital union, Judeo-Christian beliefs, statutes criminal-
izing sodomy, statutes prohibiting the recognition of same-sex mar-
riages, and case law stating that the right to same-sex marriages does
not exist under state law.237 While same-sex marriage opponents have
meritorious arguments against basing a public policy exception on
these grounds, the grounds will provide courts with ample ammuni-
tion to determine that a public policy exists. And given the deference
accorded states in the domestic relations arena, a reviewing court may
likely defer to the finding that a policy exists.
Similarly, although UMDA does not have the public policy excep-
tion of the Restatement, it is clear that in states that have adopted
UMDA, a public policy exception may nevertheless be utilized to
deny recognition to same-sex marriages. 238 Additionally, UMDA
states could enact a statutory exception to UMDA and, therefore,
same-sex marriages would, like polygamous and incestuous marriages,
become an exception to recognition. Thus, UMDA also protects
states' rights by allowing them to deny recognition on public policy
grounds.
Given the fact that the Restatement and UMDA protect states'
rights to deny recognition to same-sex marriages, DOMA unnecessa-
rily rescinds the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. As
established in Pacific, the mandates of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause are met, even where a state denies recognition to the marital
union, wherever a strong public policy against recognition exists. The
235. See supra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
236. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 105 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
237. See supra notes 76-134 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
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Restatement and UMDA comply with the mandate of Pacific by re-
quiring a strong public policy against recognition be found before rec-
ognition is denied.239 While the existence of a strong public policy is
not guaranteed due to the many arguments same-sex couples may as-
sert against such a policy, such is the price of adhering to the Constitu-
tion. If a public policy against same-sex marriages is lacking, then the
Full Faith and Credit Clause mandates recognition. Therefore,
DOMA is both unnecessary and unconstitutional.
C. Other Constitutional Challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act
In addition, even if the Court were to rule that Congress has not
violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause and exceeded its Article IV
powers by enacting DOMA, the Act would still need to survive a host
of other constitutional challenges in order to be upheld. The rights at
issue under DOMA "derive from the most sacred of sources, the Con-
stitution. '240 To deny same-sex couples the right to have their mar-
riages recognized in other states raises due process concerns,241 equal
protection issues,242 federalism concerns, 243 and invokes an inquiry
239. See supra notes 176-202 and accompanying text.
240. Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
241. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV (stating no State shall "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws"); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(noting that marriage is a fundamental right which, if denied, results in a denial of due process).
242. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV (stating that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"); see also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628
(1996) (holding that the amendment to Colorado's Constitution that prohibited all legislative,
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect homo-
sexual persons from discrimination, violated the Equal Protection Clause, because "if the consti-
tutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest" (citing Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))
(emphasis added); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 n.19 (Haw. 1993) (noting the compelling
reasons for which marriage is prohibited in Hawaii), remanded sub nom., Baehr v. Miike, CIV.
No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
243. Congress may also have violated federalism principles, because the Supreme Court
should be the final arbitrator over the exceptions to the application of the Full Faith and Clause.
The United States has a federalist system of government. See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp.
1362, 1367 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that Congress usurped a role that is "exclusively judicial"
by enacting a stay provision under the Prison Litigation Reform Act). This means that the
United States is comprised of "a union of states [which] recognizes the sovereignty of a central
authority while retaining certain residual powers of government." AMERICAN HERrrAGE Dic-
TIONARY 494 (2nd College ed. 1982). The Framers of the Constitution established a federalist
structure, because they believed that "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-ap-
pointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST
No. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed. 1888). The Framers established a
federal government consisting of "three distinct Branches, each to exercise one of the govern-
mental powers recognized by the Framers as inherently distinct" in order to guard against this
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into the constitutional right to travel. 244  It is doubtful whether
DOMA could survive a constitutional attack on those grounds even if
DOMA were found to not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
III. IMPACT
Whether DOMA is constitutionally sanctioned under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is most important due to the impact a finding of
constitutionality would bring. The most important right to same-sex
couples is that denied them by DOMA. Not only are same-sex
couples denied the fundamental right to marry by DOMA, 245 but they
are also denied a host of benefits associated only with the marital
union.246 Moreover, to uphold DOMA sets a dangerous precedent in
tyranny. Hadix, 933 F. Supp. at 1367 (citing Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982)).
Article III of the Constitution sets forth the power of the judicial branch. U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2. These powers include the ability to decide "[c]ontroversies between two or more States."
Id. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), the Supreme Court held that Article III estab-
lishes that the judiciary has the power "to say what the law is." Id. at 177. Thus, the judicial
branch has the ability to decide all cases and controversies arising under the laws of the United
States. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
"When Congress enacts a rule which mandates the outcome of a case, such that the interven-
ing step in which a court interprets and applies the rule on a case-by-case basis is effectively
eliminated, Congress encroaches upon that power which has been reserved for the independent
Judiciary." Hadix, 933 F.Supp. at 1366 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871)).
DOMA states that same-sex marriages are not among those laws which must be given effect
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1997). This statement mandates the
outcome of a case which would challenge DOMA under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Ad-
herence to the statutory language of DOMA would mean the Court's power to determine if a
state's failure to recognize a same-sex marriage validly performed in another state violates the
Full Faith and Credit Clause is removed. This is because DOMA, by its terms, states no viola-
tion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause exists. Id. For this reason alone, DOMA may well be
unconstitutional.
244. The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified. United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966); see also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 254-55 (1974) (finding a one-year residency requirement for non-emergency medical care
violated the Constitution); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-342 (1972) (finding a state
residency requirement of one year to vote unconstitutional); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 105-06 (1971) (judging constitutionality of "Ku Klux Klan Act," 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (finding a one-year residency requirement for qualifi-
cation for and receipt of welfare benefits unconstitutional). State laws restricting the ability of
citizens to invoke the protection of domestic relations laws also infringes upon the right to travel.
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 419-20 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the Iowa one-
year residency requirement needed to obtain a divorce is too restrictive, amounting to an uncon-
stitutional denial to the right of interstate travel without a sufficiently important state interest).
If DOMA were upheld, it would inhibit same-sex couples, who could marry in their domicile
state, from moving to other states, because moving may result in the invalidation of their mar-
riages. This result would constitute an unconstitutional limit on the right to interstate travel,
245. See discussion infra Part III.A.
246. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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constitutional jurisprudence. 247 If DOMA is upheld as constitutional,
Congress would have unbridled authority under Article IV to declare
that the laws of a particular state need not be recognized solely due to
a distaste for the laws of that particular state.248 This Part provides a
detailed analysis of the negative ramifications of DOMA.
A. Denial of the Fundamental Right to Marry
Most important of the rights denied to same-sex couples by DOMA
is the fundamental right to marry. The Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments from Maynard to Zablocki make clear that the right to marry is
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.249 Like couples
of opposite sexes, same-sex couples desire to partake of "one of the
'basic civil rights of man,"' 250 the fundamental right to marry.251
DOMA fails to give effect to the Supreme Court's pronouncement
that marriage is "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. '252 Instead, DOMA recognizes marriage as essential only to the
pursuit of happiness of opposite-sex couples, thereby ignoring the
happiness of same-sex couples. DOMA fails to recognize that the
fundamental importance of the right to marry is no less fundamental
because the couple is of the same sex.
DOMA proponents argue that the Supreme Court pronouncements
relating to marriage do not apply in the same-sex marriage context
because the Court cases have always addressed marriages between a
man and a woman.253 However, the fact that same-sex couples desire
to enter a union traditionally reserved by the laws of the states to a
male-female union is not dispositive of the fundamental importance of
marriage to all individuals. As the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized
in Baehr, couples desire to enter a marital union for a variety of rea-
sons: to have and raise children; to have a stable and committed rela-
tionship; for emotional closeness; for intimacy and monogamy; to
establish a framework for a long-term relationship; for personal signif-
icance; for recognition by society; and to obtain certain legal and eco-
247. See discussion infra Part III.C.
248. See discussion infra Part III.C.
249. See supra notes 135-52 and accompanying text.
250. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)).
251. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (holding that marriage is a fundamental
right); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (same); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (same).
252. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
253. See supra notes 135-52 and accompanying text.
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nomic protections.254 Thus, recognition of marriage, whether between
a man and a woman, two women, or two men, is a matter of the ut-
most importance to the individuals.
While it is true that same-sex couples are not entirely denied the
right to marry in that they are free to marry partners of the opposite
sex, that is not dispositive of the inquiry of whether they are being
denied the fundamental right to marry. In Loving, the Court rejected
a similar contention by finding that denial of the right to marry part-
ners of a different race violated the Constitution.255 Similarly, in
Zablocki, the Court found a constitutional violation where the peti-
tioner was denied the right to marry a certain class of persons: persons
unable to meet their child support obligations. 256 Denying citizens the
right to marry a class of persons, same-sex partners, deprives the citi-
zen of the fundamental right to marry just as the denial of the right to
marry a class of persons-African-Americans in Loving, and persons
delinquent on child-support payments in Zablocki-was held to be a
constitutional violation. Because DOMA would deny same-sex
couples the right to have their marriages recognized outside the state
in which they were married, they would be denied the fundamental
right to marry.
B. Loss of the Benefits Associated with Marriage
In addition to being denied a right fundamental under our Constitu-
tion, to uphold DOMA would result in same-sex married couples los-
ing a variety of benefits associated with marriage. First, at the federal
level, same-sex couples are denied bankruptcy protection, burial
rights, medical benefits, pension benefits, welfare benefits, govern-
ment education loans, preferential tax treatment, and surviving spouse
rights relating to veterans benefits, copyright protection, and social
security benefits. 257 Additionally, marriage is often accompanied by
tax advantages at both the state and federal level, including deduc-
tions, credits, rates, exemptions and estimates.258 Third, the inheri-
tance rights such as notice, protection, benefits, dower and curtsey are
also affected by marital status.259 Fourth, marital status determines a
variety of health benefits, including insurance coverage, next-of-kin
254. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,59 (1993), remanded sub nom., Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-
1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
255. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
256. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
257. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
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status, public assistance, and exemptions relating to state health de-
partments.2 60 Fifth, pre-marital agreements will not be upheld where
the marriage is not recognized.261 Sixth, without a valid marriage
couples are not entitled to any post-divorce rights, including spousal
support and property division.262 Seventh, marital status is often a
factor in child custody hearings even where the spouse is not the bio-
logical parent of the child in dispute.2 63 Eighth, the ability to exempt
real property from attachment or execution is dependent on marital
status.2 64 Ninth, invalidation of a couple's marriage would result in
termination of their right to bring a wrongful-death suit since that
right is only extended to surviving spouses, parents, children, and de-
pendents.2 65 Tenth, same-sex couples cannot achieve citizenship for
their partners through marriage.266 Finally, a number of private bene-
fits are attached to marital status including insurance coverage on car
rentals and announcements of marriages and engagements in newspa-
pers.2 67 The multitude of private and governmental benefits that at-
tach to marriage make interstate recognition of same-sex marriages of
paramount concern for those married couples.
C. The Constitutional Precedent Established by DOMA
To uphold DOMA would leave the Court impotent to prevent fu-
ture violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause via congressional
legislation, thereby rendering the Full Faith and Credit Clause without
effect. A hypothetical revision of PKPA and DOMA illustrate the
dangerous constitutional precedent that would be established if
DOMA were upheld as a valid exercise of Congress's Article IV
power.
The current PKPA states: "The appropriate authorities of every
State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except
as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determi-
nation made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court
of another State. '2 68 Under current constitutional requirements, the
states could not refuse to honor child support determinations without
260. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
268. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1994).
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the existence of a strong public policy violation to justify the non-
recognition. 269
However, if the Court were to uphold DOMA, then the public pol-
icy rationale of Pacific could be easily bypassed by congressional legis-
lation. Congress could, with its now enlarged Article IV power,
modify PKPA to follow the language of DOMA. Imagine if PKPA did
follow DOMA and merely read: "No State, territory, or possession of
the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to
any child custody determination made by a court of another State."
Under this fictional version of PKPA, a parent who was not granted
custody in State A could simply take the child to State B for a new
custody hearing. Indeed, this parent could go state to state until he or
she was finally granted custody-forum shopping for the most benefi-
cial custody determination. The Court would be bound by stare deci-
sis established by the rejected challenge to DOMA, and, thus, would
be unable to find a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Par-
ents across the country would be left with no security regarding their
child custody determinations absent non-obligatory comity by sister
states.
Additionally, what if Congress revised DOMA to state that no mar-
riages performed in one state need be recognized by other states?
Again, due to the Court finding DOMA constitutional there would
not need to be a finding of a public policy violation as required in
Pacific. States could, under the revised DOMA, arbitrarily and capri-
ciously refuse recognition to certain marriages without any violation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. A bare desire to generate greater
revenue for the state by requiring all married couples to re-marry in
that State or even unfounded animus toward a particular union could
motivate such a state decision. Married couples would be left without
security that their marriages would be recognized in sister states. As
noted by the Restatement, such a result would cause tremendous
hardship on married couples and their children. 270
The possible scenarios are numerous, but the point is clear: If Con-
gressional action removing the requirements of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is sanctioned via DOMA, there is nothing left to stop
Congress from removing Full Faith and Credit requirements in other
269. See supra notes 76-134 and accompanying text.
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 283 cmt. h (1971). The Restatement
notes "the hardship that might otherwise be visited upon the parties and their children" if mar-
riages were not recognized as valid in sister states. Id. While same-sex couples are physically
incapable of having a biological child, they are not prevented from having a child from artificial
insemination or from adopting a child.
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areas. And while the fictional versions of PKPA and DOMA are ex-
treme examples, it is impossible to determine what scenarios will arise
in the future or what public sentiment will pressure Congress to pass
certain legislation. For the Court to sanction this Congressional exer-
cise of power would, in effect, render the Court powerless to stop nu-
merous constitutional violations. DOMA calls out for a revitalization
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; it calls out for the Supreme Court
to assert its judicial authority to prevent an unwarranted and non-enu-
merated expansion in congressional power under Article IV.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress's power to pass legislation under Article IV is subject to
the mandates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Congress exceeded
its delegated powers when it enacted DOMA because DOMA re-
scinds the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the arena
of same-sex marriages. Not only is Congress's abrogation of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause unauthorized by the text and history of that
clause, but its passage of DOMA also fails to comport with the re-
quirements imposed by the Supreme Court cases interpreting the
clause. The requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause must be
adhered to unless a procedural issue is involved or unless the recogni-
tion of the sister-state judgment would violate the public policy of the
state. DOMA fails to invoke either exception to the requirements of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and, instead, eliminates the opera-
tion of the clause altogether. To uphold DOMA would give constitu-
tional authority to a congressional exercise of power that is aimed at
avoiding the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The negative ramifications ensuing from DOMA warrant a finding
that DOMA is unconstitutional. DOMA denies same-sex couples the
fundamental right to marry, thereby preventing same-sex couples
from taking advantage of the numerous benefits associated with the
marital relationship. Additionally, a dangerous constitutional prece-
dent is established through DOMA because Congress passed DOMA
to authorize the states to ignore the valid act of a sister state based
solely on a dislike for that state's laws. To uphold DOMA would un-
dermine century-old Court mandates that establish that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause must be adhered to in interstate recognition of
records, acts, and judicial proceedings. While states may disagree with
same-sex marriages, recognition is required under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as the price of our federal system of government. In
defense of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, the
Defense of Marriage Act should be declared unconstitutional.
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